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Abstract
Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when
the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value dis-
tribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few
categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For
example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity
to buy an item based on past behavior, or in the case of ad auctions, the click through rate
of their ads. We introduce an alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are a
priori identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the auctioneer
obtains at the time of the auction.
We extend the sample complexity approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. [7] and Cole and Rough-
garden [6] to this model and obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we
obtain a revenue monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how
to use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity bound of Cole
and Roughgarden [6] for the non-identical but independent value distribution case.
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1 Introduction
Myerson’s [16] theory of optimal auctions has been (deservingly) much celebrated. When bidders’
values are independently and identically distributed (iid), it gives the beautiful conclusion that a
second price auction with a reserve price is revenue optimal among all incentive compatible and
individually rational auction formats. When the bidders are distinguishable, via a distinct value
distribution for each bidder, the theory still characterizes the optimal auction, even though it is
not as simple as in the iid case.
The non-identical but independent distribution (non-iid) model could be applicable in practice
when bidders can be classified into a few different categories, and market research provides a
distribution for each of these. The starting point for this paper is the observation that often,
the classification of bidders is a continuum, rather than discrete. Suppose for instance that the
auctioneer knows the incomes of all the bidders. It is reasonable to assume that bidders with
higher incomes in general have higher valuations and thus use this information in the auction
design. Similarly the auctioneer could use knowledge about the bidders’ past purchasing behavior
to distinguish between them. The same observation applies if you have a seller who simply offers
an item at a posted price, which is equivalent to an “auction with a single agent”.
In this paper, we propose a model where the side information that can be used to distinguish
between the bidders comes from a continuum. A priori, bidders are identical: all bidders draw
two numbers, a value and a “signal”, iid from a joint probability distribution. The signal is a real
number in [0, 1] that captures the side information that the auctioneer has about the bidder. We
assume that the marginal distribution of the values conditioned on the signal is monotone in the
signal, in the order of first order stochastic dominance.
Even when the bidder categories are discrete,1 it is more natural that there is a distribution
over categories. If bidders from some categories appear more often than others, then it is more
important that the auction does the right thing for these categories. Also, it is more natural that
this is represented in the samples as well, so the number of samples for each category would be
different if you collected samples at random from the population. Further, it is very common to
have a total ordering on the categories, where bidders in the higher categories have higher values,
and this structure could be exploited. (See Leonardi and Roughgarden [14], Bhattacharya et al. [3]
for example.) Our model incorporates these aspects of the real world and hence is a better fit for
many practical applications.
Ad Auctions Billions of auctions are run each day for ads, for search and display advertising.
Setting reserve prices in these auctions has received a lot of attention [10, 21, 18, 17], and has been
one of the prime applications of Myerson’s theory [17]. Common techniques in practice include using
machine learning algorithms, to map features of an auction into one of few categories, and use the
corresponding reserve price. These settings might benefit from a “continuous categorization”,2
where the machine learning algorithms map the features to a real number instead. This would
correspond exactly to our model, with this number as the signal. One such number might already
be calculated: it has been observed that the click-through rates are positively correlated with
bids/values, so these rates can be used as the signals. Such a phenomenon, of using the click-through
rates to differentially charge bidders already happens currently, although indirectly, through the
practice of “squashing” [13].
1Note that our model can handle discrete categories as well, where the signal is just an encoding of the categories.
2The techniques used are mostly from continuous optimization, with extra effort required to map these into discrete
categories.
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Sample Complexity When the joint probability distribution over values and signals is com-
pletely known to the auctioneer, Myerson’s theory readily extends to this case: simply run Myer-
son’s auction on the conditional value distributions. The question that we consider in this paper
is that of sample complexity: how many samples from the distribution are necessary/sufficient to
approximate the optimal auction?
The sample complexity approach to revenue maximization [7, 6, 12, 15] assumes that we are
given access to samples from the value distribution and measures the number of samples that are
necessary/sufficient to approximate the optimal auction. This study is motivated by the observation
that the source of priors is really past data, both in principle and in practice [17]. The goal has
been to put such practices on a sound theoretical footing, by identifying principled approaches and
precisely quantifying the value of data.
Dhangwatnotai et al. [7] initiated this line of research, by giving almost tight bounds for the case
of a single agent, which was later extended to multiple agents (with non-identical but independent
regular distributions) by Cole and Roughgarden [6]. In this paper we improve the upper bound in
their [6] model, which we’ll refer to as the non-iid model, from O˜(n10−7) to O˜(n−4). A detailed
discussion of the upper and lower bounds for different variants, and comparisons with other related
work such as Morgenstern and Roughgarden [15], Huang et al. [12] is in Section 2.2.
Techniques The improvement in the sample complexity upper bounds in the non-iid model
comes from taking a PAC learning/Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) approach. We first show
how to discretize the value space while losing only an O() fraction of the revenue. This then
allows us to bound the number of different mechanisms that we need to consider. Then we use a
concentration inequality to argue that for each mechanism in this class, its revenue on the sample
closely approximates its actual revenue from the distribution. Thus, using the best auction on the
sample suffices.
As an important part of this approach we prove a new concentration inequality that might be
of independent interest. Consider the revenue of a mechanism with n agents in the non-iid model.
Consider a matrix of values, each drawn independently, with the values in column i drawn from the
distribution corresponding to agent i. Chernoff bounds tells us that the revenue of the mechanism
averaged over the row vectors of this matrix is close to its expected revenue w.r.t the distribution.
Our concentration inequality gives the same conclusion for the revenue of the mechanism w.r.t.
the product of the empirical distributions over each column of the matrix. Due to this, instead of
finding the optimal auction for a correlated distribution, it is sufficient to find the optimal auction
for a product distribution, a computationally easy task.
The model with side information, which we’ll refer to as the Signals model, presents the
following new conceptually important challenge: we cannot rely on having seen samples with exactly
the same signals as the participants in the auction. This requires us to be able to interpolate
using samples from different distributions, rather than use samples from the same distribution
as in the non-iid model.3 We do this by using just the right number of signals in the sample
immediately below the actual signal of an agent, and run a version of the Empirical Myerson auction.
The approximation factor is proved via a careful charging argument. Our bounds depend on the
following quantity: suppose that an  fraction of the revenue is contributed by the top q() fraction
(in probability mass) of signals. For instance, when there is a single agent, O(log(1 )q()
−1−3)
samples are sufficient and Ω(log( 1q())
−4) are necessary.4
3This introduces additional difficulties such as that convex combinations of regular distributions are not regular,
e.g., see Sivan and Syrgkanis [20].
4This is not a contradiction since q() is always at most  and x log(1/x) is a monotone increasing function for
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An essential component of interpolating from different distributions is revenue monotonicity.
Consider the optimal auction M for a given product distribution D. If M is run on values that
come from a higher (component wise first order stochastic dominating) distribution, does it get a
higher revenue? Surprisingly, as far as we know, this fundamental question about optimal auctions
was unanswered prior to this paper; we resolve this in the affirmative. Another application of this
property is in devising mechanisms when only certain statistics (such as the medians) of the value
distributions are known (Azar et al. [1]).5 The proof of this property is indirect;6 we first reduce
this to a weaker property, namely monotonicity of the optimum revenue (over a larger class of
distributions), using Sion’s minimax theorem [19]. We then show monotonicity of the optimum
revenue using convexity of the optimum revenue in the space of distributions.
For the lower bounds, we extend the instances used by Huang et al. [12], by packing scaled
copies of them among the conditional distributions for different signals. We can show that in order
to achieve high revenue overall it is necessary to achieve high revenue in most of the conditionals.
Moreover, in order to get good revenue from any conditional (even with exact knowledge of the
rest) a reduction to classification shows that −3 samples are necessary; the bound follows.
Extensions Our results can be extended to more general single parameter families of auction
environments. We can also get better upper bounds for the case of n agents when we are required
to optimize over a smaller class of auctions, such as VCG with reserve prices. We discuss these
extensions in Section 6.
Other Related Work Elkind [9] also considers a learning question very similar to the sample
complexity line of work [7, 6, 12, 15], in the presence of an oracle that returns the expected profit
of a given mechanism, for distributions with finite support. This line of work is also close in spirit
to Balcan et al. [2], who use PAC learning techniques to design prior-free auctions in a general
setting. In fact, Huang et al. [12] note that the results of Balcan et al. [2] can be used to deduce
sample complexity bounds in the iid model. In addition to the lower bound of Ω(−3) for regular
distributions, Huang et al. [12] also show tight bounds of Θ˜(−3/2) for MHR distributions. While
all these results are for single parameter environments, Dughmi et al. [8] show an exponential lower
bound for a multi parameter setting.
Future Directions Much of the auction theory since Myerson, in particular in the algorithmic
game theory literature, is devoted to cases where the distributions are not known. One can ask
several “simple vs. optimal” questions in the side information setting, such as an extension of the
famous result of Bulow and Klemperer [4]: how much does the market size have to increase for
small enough x.
5A natural mechanism to consider in such a setting is the optimal mechanism w.r.t. the minimal distribution with
the given statistics. Given the value of the median µ, the distribution which is 0 or µ with probability 1
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each is first
order stochastically dominated by all other distributions with median µ.
6Direct approaches seem to fail here. Consider the following example, where increasing one component distribution
first increases the revenue, and then increasing another component decreases the revenue (all w.r.t. an optimal
mechanism for the original distribution). There are two bidders: bidder 1 has value distribution U [0, 100] and bidder
2 has distribution U [0, 1]. The virtual value functions are φ1 = 2v − 100 and φ2 = 2v − 1 respectively. If bidder 1’s
distribution is replaced by U [50, 100], the revenue strictly increases, since the probability of allocating the item to
her (for a high price) increases. In fact bidder 1 always gets the item, except when she has a value in [50, 50.5] and
bidder 2 has a value in [0.5, 1] with higher virtual value. When this occurs the item is sold to bidder 2 for a low price.
The probability of this event strictly increases when bidder 2’s distribution is replaced with a point mass at 1, and
thus the revenue slightly decreases. The net effect is still an increase in the revenue, as guaranteed by our theorem.
This also shows that revenue monotonicity is not true w.r.t any mechanism.
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the Vickrey auction to outperform the optimal auction. Another interesting direction is to ask for
the design of a prior-independent mechanism in this model, which might be easier than a similar
attempt in the prior-free setting by Leonardi and Roughgarden [14] and Bhattacharya et al. [3].
Finally, extending this model to align it even closer with how machine learning algorithms are used,
by directly considering high dimensional signal space is a really exciting direction.
2 Preliminaries and Main Results
2.1 Preliminaries
Auctions: A single item is auctioned to n bidders; the value of bidder i for the item is vi. From
the revelation principle, it is sufficient to consider direct revelation mechanisms: a mechanism M
is a pair of functions (x, p), both taking as input a reported value profile v = (v1, . . . , vn). The
allocation function x has for each bidder i, a component xi that represents her probability of
winning the item. Similarly the payment function p has component pi for the payment of bidder i.
The utility of bidder i is vixi − pi.
A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if the utility of a bidder i is
maximized, no matter what the other agents report, by reporting her true value. A mechanism is
individually rational (IR) if the utility of all bidders is non-negative, for all valuation profiles.
The objective we consider in this paper is the revenue of a mechanism, when the values are
drawn from a given probability distribution. We let Rev (M,D) denote the expected revenue of
mechanism M when v is drawn from distribution D:
Rev (M,D)
def
= Ev∼D
[∑
i
pi (v)
]
.
Throughout the paper we only consider DSIC and IR mechanisms, and therefore omit qualifying
mechanisms as DSIC and IR everywhere. The mechanism that maximizes Rev (·,D) for a given
distribution D, among all DSIC and IR mechanisms, is called the optimal auction, and its revenue
is denoted by Opt (D).
Myerson’s Optimal Auction: Myerson [16] characterizes the optimal auction for product dis-
tributions D = D1×· · ·×Dn. The optimal auction is simple to describe under the assumption that
each Di is regular, which means that the virtual value function φi(v)
def
= v− 1−Fi(v)fi(v) is monotonically
non decreasing, where fi is the density and Fi is the CDF of D
i. For this case, Myerson’s optimal
auction allocates the item to the bidder with the highest virtual value (breaking ties arbitrarily).
The winner pays
pi
def
= min{p : ∀ j 6= i, φi(p) ≥ φj(vj), & φi(p) ≥ 0} = max
j 6=i
{φ−1i (φj(vj))} ∪ {φ−1i (0)}.
Sample Complexity: Dhangwatnotai et al. [7] and Cole and Roughgarden [6] introduced a
sample complexity approach to the design of optimal auctions. Assume that the distribution D is
unknown to the auctioneer, who instead has to design a mechanism M with only access to data in
the form of m i.i.d. samples s(1), . . . , s(m) drawn from D. The mechanism M is then run on a fresh
vector of values (the real input) drawn from D.
The sample complexity of a given mechanism M against a given class of distributions is specified
as a function of  ∈ [0, 1], and is defined to be the smallest number of samples m such that for all
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distributions D in the given class
Es(1),...,s(m)∼D[Rev (M,D)] ≥ (1− )Opt (D) .
Here it is implicit that the mechanism M depends on the samples s(1), · · · , s(m).
Auctions with Side Information: In this paper, we introduce a model where the auctioneer
has some information correlated with the bidders’ values. We assume that bidder i has a value-
“signal” pair (vi, σi), drawn from a joint distribution D. As before, vi is her valuation for the item
and σi ∈ [0, 1] is a signal observed by the auctioneer, e.g., her annual income, her propensity to
buy an item based on past behavior, or in case of ad auctions the click-through rate of her ad.
For a given signal σ, we denote the conditional distribution over values by Dσ. It is convenient to
think of D as a family of 1-dimensional distributions {Dσ : σ ∈ [0, 1]}, along with the marginal
distribution over σ, given by the cdf FD,σ. We assume throughout this paper that D is such that
if σi > σj , then D
σj is first order stochastically dominated by Dσi (denoted by Dσi  Dσj ). The
mechanism now has as input the actual signals, in addition to the reported values.
We extend the sample complexity approach to this model: the auctioneer first observes m i.i.d.
value-signal pairs sampled from the given distribution, which can be used to design a mechanism.
The sample complexity will as before depends on  ∈ (0, 1) (among other parameters), and is
defined as the minimum number of samples m required to achieve a 1 −  fraction of the optimal
revenue Optsignals (D), defined as
Optsignals (D) def= Eσ1,σ2,...,σn∼FD,σ [Opt (Dσ1 ×Dσ2 × · · · ×Dσn)].
The Signals model is incomparable to the non-iid model. Note that in this model, the bidders are
a priori identical, but become non identical once the signals are observed. This allows a mechanism
to be a priori symmetric, and distinguish between the bidders based only on the signal. Also in this
model, the samples may contain entirely different signal values than the actual signals. Further,
there is a distribution over signals themselves which affects the definition of Optsignals (D). Both of
the models however generalize the case of i.i.d value distributions. We call a distribution D regular
if each Dσ is regular.
2.2 Main Results
Table 1 summarizes the main results. Our results come in two flavors: improved sample complexity
upper bounds for the standard model without signals, as well as lower and upper bounds for the
Signals model. Finally, we highlight some of the technical lemmas that would be of independent
interest.
1. Regular distributions. We significantly lower the gap between the upper and lower bounds
from Cole and Roughgarden [6], which were respectively Ω(n−1) and O˜(n10−7). For the case of
n = 1, Huang et al. [12] showed a lower bound of Ω(−3).
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Model
Number
of
agents
Distributions Lower Bound Upper bound
non-iid model 1 Regular Ω
(
−3
)
[12] O
(
−3 log 1
)
[7]
non-iid model n Regular
Ω
(
max{n−1, −3})
[6, 12]
O˜
(
n−4
)
(Section 4)
non-iid model n MHR Ω
(
−3/2
)
[12] O˜
(
n−3
)
(Section 4)
non-iid model n Support ⊆ [1, h] Ω (h−2) [12] O˜ (nh−3) (Section
4)
Signals model 1
Regular, q
bounded tail
Ω
(
−4log
(
1
q()
))
(Section 5.3)
O
(
q()−1−3log(1 )
)
(Section 5.1)
Signals model n
Regular, q
bounded tail
O˜
(
n2q()−1−4
)
(Section 5.2)
Table 1: Summary of sample complexity upper and lower bounds for various auction settings.
2. Beyond regular distributions. Morgenstern and Roughgarden [15] consider the sample
complexity question a` la Cole and Roughgarden [6], but restricted to bounded support distributions.
The support is assumed to lie in [1, h], for some fixed value of h. They show an information
theoretic upper bound of O˜(nh2−3) for such distributions, as well as a bound of O˜(n/3) for MHR
distributions. They use the technique of bounding the pseudo-dimension, from statistical learning
theory, as compared to our more elementary technique of building an -net; both approaches are
similar in spirit.
Update: In the conference version of this paper we focused mainly on regular distributions, but
our techniques are general enough to handle arbitrary distributions on bounded support, as in
Morgenstern and Roughgarden [15]. We show how a simple modification of our techniques obtains
an improved O˜(nh−3) bound for bounded support distributions, and recovers their O˜(n/3) bound
for MHR distributions. With our new concentration inequality, we also obtain computational
efficiency. We rewrite our technical sections (Section 4 and Section 6) to clarify how our techniques
are general enough to be applied to these other families of distributions.
3. Signals model. Our sample complexity bounds for the signals model depend on the following
property of the distribution.
Definition 1 (small-tail in signal space). Given a function q : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], say that a distribution
D has a q-bounded tail in the signal space if
Eσ1,...,σn∼FD,σ [1{∀ i, FD,σ(σi) ≤ 1− q()}Opt (Dσ1 × · · · ×Dσn)] ≥ (1− )Optsignals (D) .
For the case of a single agent, the Signals model has an upper bound that is larger by a factor
of 1/q(), while the lower bound is larger by a factor of log (1/q()) −1, and q() is always no larger
than . It is to be expected that the Signals model requires more samples, since we need to cover
the entire spectrum of different Dσs. At least a linear dependence on q() seems necessary, since we
need at least those many samples to even see a single σ in the top q() quantile, which contribute
an  fraction of revenue.
With n agents, note that one sample in the non-iid model is actually n values, whereas one
sample in the Signals model is only one value. Taking this into account, the upper bounds still
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differ by a factor of 1/q(). We currently don’t have any lower bounds for the Signals model, since
in this model, having more agents could actually help! Closing the gap between the bounds, or
parameterizing the bounds using other reasonable quantities are interesting open questions.
4. Beyond single item auctions. Our techniques also extend to more general single parameter
environments such as matroid and downward closed environments. See Section 6 for details.
5. Revenue Monotonicity. We say that a product distribution D = ΠiD
i component-wise
stochastically dominates a product distribution D′ = ΠiDi
′
(and denote it by D  Dˆ) if for each
i, we have that Di  Di′. We prove the following theorem which might be of independent interest:
Theorem 2.1. [Revenue Monotonicity] Let D0 be a product distribution with finite support. There
exists M0 which is an optimal auction for D0 such that for all finite support distributions D  D0,
Rev (M0,D0) ≤ Rev (M0,D) .
Remark 2.1. All optimal auctions are virtual welfare maximizers, identical up to tie breaking
rules. We can make the optimal auction for a product distribution D0 unique as follows: add an
infinitesimal i to all values in the (finite) support of D
i
0, such that i > i+1. In the new product
distribution the revenue is the same, but the only optimal tie breaking rule is lexicographical.
6. Concentration Inequality. We prove the following concentration inequality, which is useful
in showing that the revenue of a mechanism on a given product distribution is close to its revenue
on the empirical product distribution. This should be of independent interest.
Theorem 2.2. Let V be an arbitrary set, f be an arbitrary function from V n to [0, 1], and
X1, . . . , Xn ∈ V be random variables independently drawn from D1, . . . , Dn respectively. Suppose
p = Ex∈D[f(x)]. Let xi1, . . . , xim be m i.i.d. samples from Di, Ei be the uniform distribution over
{xi1, . . . , xim} for all i ∈ [n], and E = ΠiEi. Then, we have
Pr
xij ,∀i∈[n],j∈[m]
[∣∣ E
x∈E
[f(x)]− p∣∣ ≥ 2δ] ≤ 2e− 2mδ24p+δ −ln(δ).
Organization: We begin with proving Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in Section 3. The sample complexity
bounds for single item auctions in the standard model are in Section 4, and the bounds for the
Signals model are in Section 5. The extensions to more general single parameter environments are
in Section 6.
3 Revenue Monotonicity and Concentration Inequality
In this section prove Theorems 2.1 and 2.2.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let M be the set of all DSIC and IR mechanisms for n buyers and one item, with values in the
support of D0. Let M be the convex hull of M. Let D be the set of all product distrubutions
D, such that D  D0, and D the convex hull of D. Note that D is not the set of all correlated
7
distributions that marginals-wise first order stochastic dominate D0. The theorem would not be
true w.r.t. this set.7 We first show the following:
Claim 3.1. maxM∈M minD∈DRev(M,D) = minD∈D maxM∈MRev(M,D).
Proof. We’ll apply the following theorem, known as Sion’s minimax theorem ([19]):
Theorem (Sion’s minimax theorem). Let X be a compact convex subset of a linear topological
space and Y a convex subset of a linear topological space. If f is a real-valued function on X × Y
with
• f(x, ·) upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave on Y , ∀x ∈ X, and
• f(·, y) lower semicontinuous and quasi-convex on X, ∀y ∈ Y
then,
min
x∈X
sup
y∈Y
f(x, y) = sup
y∈Y
min
x∈X
f(x, y).
M and D are both convex and compact, and both Rev (·, D), Rev (M, ·) are linear functions
and continuous by definition.
Let g(D) = maxM∈MRev (M,D). Using the minimax theorem, we show that it is sufficient to
prove monotonicity of g in the domain D, as formalized in this claim.
Claim 3.2. D0 ∈ argminD∈Dg(D).
Before we prove Claim 3.2 we’ll need the following propositions:
Proposition 3.1 (Monotonicity of Optimal Revenue). Suppose D and Dˆ are product distributions
such that Dˆ  D. Then, the optimal revenue of Dˆ is greater than the optimal revenue of D .i.e.,
g(Dˆ) ≥ g(D).
Proof. We’ll prove this by constructing a mechanism for Dˆ with revenue at least Opt (D). Let M
be the optimal mechanism for D. Let xi and pi be the corresponding allocation and payment rules
of an agent i: xi and pi take as input the value profile v; xi(v) then equals the probability that i
gets the item; and pi(v) equals the price i needs to pay. By our tie-breaking rule in Remark 2.1,
we have that xi(v) ∈ {0, 1}, and pi(v) > 0 only if xi(v) = 1.
We will interpret these rules as operating on the quantile space, rather than the value space. For
this, we need to define maps from values to quantiles and back. For any i ∈ [n], and qi ∈ [0, 1], let
vi(qi) be the corresponding value of agent i, i.e., vi(qi) = inf{v : Fi(v) ≥ qi}, where Fi is the CDF of
distribution Di. We now consider the mechanism M as acting on the quantile space. Suppose q ∈
[0, 1]n be a quantile profile where qi denotes the quantile of agent i. Let v(q) =
(
v1(q1), . . . , vn(qn)
)
.
We abuse notation and let xi(q) = xi(v(q)), and pi(q) = pi(v(q)). The corresponding values for
the distribution Fˆi are denoted vˆi(qi).
On the other hand, the map from value to quantiles is not unique, because there could be point
masses in the distribution. Instead, we map each value to an interval in the quantile space: let
`i(vi) = supv<vi Fi(v) and ui(vi) = Fi(vi). We think of vi as mapped to the interval [`i(vi), ui(vi)].
When `i = ui, then vi is just mapped to a single point. Note that for any quantile q ∈ [`i(vi), ui(vi)],
7This is easy to see. Consider two bidders that have either a high or a low value with equal probability, in-
dependently. If we make the distributions correlated so that either they both have the high value or low value
simultaneously, then the optimum revenue decreases.
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the map back to the value space gives vi(q) = vi. The corresponding values for the distribution Fˆi
are denoted ˆ`i and uˆi.
Now, consider the following (randomized) mechanism Mˆ for Dˆ. Given any reported value profile
vˆ, translate them to quantiles by sampling qi: sample qi uniformly at random from the interval
[ˆ`i(vi), uˆi(vi)]. Then, Mˆ gives agent i the item if xi(v(q)) = 1. In terms of payment, we cannot
simply charge pi(q) = pi(v(q)) when agent i wins because that does not guarantee truthfulness
in general. Instead, let q∗i = li(pi(q)) be the threshold quantile for agent i to become a winner.
Then, we will charge agent i the (threshold) value that corresponds to q∗i , i.e., Mˆ charges agent i
a payment equals vˆi(q
∗
i ).
This mechanism Mˆ is truthful. Recall that xi(v) and pi(v) correspond to the allocation and
payment rules of the optimal mechanism w.r.t. D. Thus, fixed the values v−i of other agents,
xi(v) is a step function, and pi(v) equals the threshold value above which i becomes the winner.
Quantiles are monotone in values, therefore, xi(q) is also a step function, once we fix the quantiles
of other agents; the threshold is q∗i . From agent i’s point of view, he gets the item if his reported
value induces a quantile that is greater than q∗i . (If his induced quantile is exactly q
∗
i , then he may
or may not get the item, based on the tie breaking rule.) If vˆi(q
∗
i ) is a point mass, and agent i
reports this value, then he gets the item with some probability depending on the initial sampling
of qi. For any strictly higher reported value, he gets the item for sure. Further, our payment for
agent i is exactly this threshold value vi(q
∗
i ).
The mechanism Mˆ yields revenue at least Opt (D) under truthful reporting. We couple the
randomness in the draws of values in the two distributions, as well as the randomization in the
mechanism Mˆ as follows: first sample a quantile qi ∈ [0, 1] u.a.r., and then choose the values vi(qi)
and vˆi(qi) for the corresponding distributions. In mechanism Mˆ , we simpy use this qi instead of
sampling it again. For a fixed quantile profile, the winner is the same in both mechanisms by
definition; let this winner be i. Given the threshold quantile q∗i as defined above, the payments
in mechanisms M and Mˆ are (by definition) vi(q
∗
i ) and vˆi(q
∗
i ) respectively. The latter can only
be higher due to the stochastic dominance assumption. Since the revenue of this mechanism for
Dˆ is at least Opt (D), we have that the optimal revenue of Dˆ must be at least Opt (D), which
completes the proof.
As a direct corollary, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. For all product distributions D ∈ D it holds that:
∇D−D0g (D0) ≥ 0
Now we’re ready to prove Claim 3.2:
Proof of Claim 3.2. We’ll treat a distribution D ∈ D as a point in Rc, where c is the number of
possible valuation tuples, i.e. the size of the support of D. Since we’re only considering discrete
distributions, this is a finite dimensional space.
Notice that g is a convex function, since it’s the max of linear functions. From Proposition 3.2,
we know that the directional derivate of g along D−D0 is positive, for all D ∈ D. We now argue
that this implies the same for all distributions in the convex hull as well, i.e., for all D ∈ D. The
claim then immediately follows from this due to convexity of g.
Since D is in the convex hull of D, it can be written as∑j αjDj , where Dj ∈ D, and∑j αj = 1.
We want to show that ∇D−D0g (D0) ≥ 0. This is equivalent to∑
j
αj
(∇Dj−D0g (D0)) ≥ 0,
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which is implied by Proposition 3.2
The two claims above suffice to get revenue monotonicity as follows. Let h(M) = minD∈DRev (M,D),
and M∗ ∈ arg maxM h(M). The following sequence of inequalities shows that M∗ is also an optimal
mechanism for D0.
Rev(M∗,D0) ≥ min
D∈D
Rev(M∗,D) = h(M∗) = g(D0) = max
M∈M
Rev(M,D0) ≥ Rev(M∗,D0).
The second equality above is by Claim 3.1 and Claim 3.2. The rest are by definition. Now revenue
monotonicity already follows from the above, since it is equivalent to
Rev(M∗,D0) = min
D∈D
Rev(M∗,D).
3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.2
The following lemma follows by Bernstein’s inequality.
Lemma 3.1. Let y1, . . . ,ym be m i.i.d. samples from D. Then, we have
Pr
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f(yj)− p
∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2e− 2mδ24p+δ .
We relate the random variables in Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 3.1 as follows. First, draw xi1, . . . , xim
i.i.d. from Di for all i ∈ [n], and draw n permutations pi1, . . . , pin of [m] independently and uniformly
at random. Then, let yj(x, pi) be (x1pi1(j), x2pi2(j), . . . , xnpin(j)) for all j ∈ [m]. Clearly, yj(x, pi) are
i.i.d. samples from E. By Lemma 3.1,
Prx,pi
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ 2e− 2mδ24p+δ .
Equivalently,
Ex
[
Prpi
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ]] ≤ 2e− 2mδ24p+δ .
Thus, by Markov’s inequality,
Prx
[
Prpi
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ] > δ]
≤ 2e− 2mδ
2
4p+δ
−ln(δ)
(1)
Note that Ex∈E[f(x)] = Epi 1m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)
. So we have∣∣Ex∈E[f(x)]− p∣∣ ≤ Epi [ 1m∑mj=1 ∣∣f(yj(x, pi))− p∣∣]
≤ Prpi
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ]
+
1− Pr
pi
∣∣ 1
m
m∑
j=1
f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ
 δ
≤ Prpi
[∣∣ 1
m
∑m
j=1 f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ]+ δ
Therefore,
∣∣Ex∈E[f(x)]− p∣∣ ≥ 2δ implies
Pr
pi
∣∣ 1
m
m∑
j=1
f
(
yj(x, pi)
)− p∣∣ ≥ δ
 ≥ δ.
Putting together with (1), the theorem follows.
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4 Single Item Auctions in the Standard Model
4.1 Finite Support
In this subsection, consider the case that the support of the distributions is a finite subset V ⊂ [0, h]
for some h. We propose an empirical Myerson auction (Algorithm 1) and present a meta analysis
that will serve as the base case of our other results. Concretely, we will show the following:
Theorem 4.1. For any upper bound of values h > 0, any finite support of values V ⊂ [0, h], any
upper bound of the optimal revenue 0 < α ≤ h, and any additive error bound 0 < β ≤ α, Algorithm 1
takes Θ
(
αhβ−2
(
n|V | log(n|V |)+log(hγ/β))) samples and learns an empirical Myerson auction that
gets expected revenue at least Opt (D)− β with probability at least 1− γ.
Remark 4.1. Parameters α, β, γ, and h are used only in the analysis of the number of samples
needed to get the approximation guarantee. The algorithm does not need to know them in advance.
1: Parameters: h > 0 (upper bound of values); α ∈ (0, h] (upper bound of Opt (D));
β ∈ (0, α] (additive error); failure probability γ; finite set V ⊂ [0, h] (finite support).
2: Input: m = Θ
(
αhβ−2
(
n|V | log(n|V |) + log(h/γβ))) samples v1, . . . ,vm ∼ D.
3: Let Ei denote the empirical distribution of buyer i, i.e., the uniform
distribution over v1i, v2i, . . . , vmi.
4: Output: Myerson auction w.r.t. E = E1 × · · · × En.
Algorithm 1: Empirical Myerson (Finite-Support)
Proof. For any product distribution over V n, Myerson’s optimal auction picks the bidder with the
largest ironed virtual surplus. We assume w.l.o.g. that the optimal auction breaks ties uniformly at
random. Equivalently, there is a mapping σ : [n]× V 7→ {1, 2, . . . , n|V |} such that given any value
profile v1, . . . , vn ∈ V , Myerson’s optimal auction allocates the item to i∗ = arg mini∈[n] σ(i, vi). Let
Mσ denote the auction corresponding to such a mapping σ. Hence, there are at most (n|V |)n|V |
different Myerson auctions for product distributions over V n.
For any given σ, we apply Theorem 2.2 with f(v) being the revenue of Mσ when the values are
v divided by h (so that f(v) ∈ [0, 1]), δ = β/4h, and with m = Θ(αhβ−2(n|V | log(n|V |) + log γ))
samples (for a sufficiently large constant inside the big-Θ notation). Note that the expectation
p = Ex∈D[f(x)] is the expected revenue of a mechanism, which is at most Opt (D) and, thus,
p ≤ α by our assumption of α. We get the following (where the probability is over the randomness
in the m samples):
Pr
[∣∣Rev (Mσ,E)−Rev (Mσ,D) ∣∣ ≥ β2 ] ≤ 2e− 2mδ24p+δ −ln(δ) ≤ 2e−mβ240αh+ln(4h/β) ≤ γ(n|V |)−n|V | .
By union bound ∣∣Rev (Mσ,E)−Rev (Mσ,D) ∣∣ < β2 ,
for all σ with probability at least 1 − γ. Since Algorithm 1 uses the optimal auction w.r.t. E, it
gets at least Opt
(
D¯
)− β revenue in expectation.
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4.2 Bounded Support: Additive Bound
In this subsection, consider the case that the distributions have support [0, h] for some h. We seek
to learn a mechanism that is optimal up to an  additive loss in term of revenue. We show the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose the product distribution D has bounded support [0, h]. Then, for any  > 0,
there is an algorithm that takes O˜(h3n−3) samples and learns a mechanism with revenue at least
Opt (D)−O().
We will prove the theorem by reducing it to the finite support case. To do so, we first introduce
a technical lemma showing that a standard discretization of the value space decreases the optimal
revenue by at most  additively.
Lemma 4.3 (Additive Discretization of Value Space). Given any product value distribution D′,
and D′′ obtained by rounding the values from D′ to the closest multiple of  from below, we have
Opt (D′′) ≥ Opt (D′)− .
Proof. We follow the same strategy as in Proposition 3.1. We will prove the lemma by constructing
a mechanism that gets expected revenue at least Opt (D′) −  on D′′. Let M ′ be the optimal
mechanism w.r.t. D′. Consider a mechanism M ′′ with an allocation rule that proceeds as follows:
1. Given a reported value profile v′′, let q′′i ’s be the quantiles of v
′′
i ’s w.r.t. D
′′ (in case of a
point mass at v′′i , sample the quantile from the corresponding interval like in the proof of
Proposition 3.1).
2. Let v′i’s be the values that correspond to q
′′
i ’s w.r.t. D
′.
3. Use the allocation of mechanism M ′ for values v′i’s.
Clearly, the above allocation rule is monotone. Thus, there is a payment rule that makes it truth-
ful. Further, the payment of the winner equals the threshold value above which he has non-zero
probability to be the winner.
Next, we analyze the expected revenue of M ′′. As in Proposition 3.1, we couple all the ran-
domness by first sampling the quantiles. Given any quantiles q ∈ [0, 1]n, let v′ and v′′ be the
corresponding values w.r.t. D′ and D′′ respectively. Then, by our construction of M ′′, the alloca-
tion of M ′ for v′ is the same as the allocation of M ′′ for v′′, i.e., the winner is the same bidder in
both cases.
Further, the payment of each mechanism is equal to the threshold value of each winner above
which he remains a winner. Again, by our construction of M ′′, the quantiles of the threshold values
in both cases are the same.
Recall that D′′ is obtained by rounding the values from D′ to the closest multiple of  from
below. So for any given quantile (in particular, the above threshold quantiles), the corresponding
values in D′ and D′′ differs additively by at most .
Putting together, we get that the revenue of M ′ for v′, and that of M ′′ for v′′ differs additively
by at most . Since this holds for all quantiles q, the lemma follows by taking expectation over the
randomness of q ∈ [0, 1]n.
By rounding the values to their closest multiples of  from below, we reduce the problem to the
finite support case with support V = {0, , 2, . . . , h}, which has size h/. As a result, we get the
following Algorithm 2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 4.3, we get that Algorithm 2 learns an empirical
Myerson auction gets revenue at least Opt (D)−O() in expectation.
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1: Parameters: h > 0 (upper bound of values);  ∈ (0, h] (additive revenue loss);
γ > 0 (failure probability).
2: Input: m = Θ
(
h2−2(nh−1 log(nh/) + log γ−1)
)
samples v1, . . . ,vm ∼ D.
3: Run Algorithm 1 with V = {0, , 2, . . . , h}, samples rounded to the closest multiple of ,
α = h, and β =  (h and γ remain what they are).
4: Output: The empirical Myerson auction outputted by Algorithm 1, treating any value
as the closest multiple of  from below.
Algorithm 2: Empirical Myerson (Additive Bound for Bounded-Support Distributions)
4.3 Bounded Support: Multiplicative Bound
In this subsection, consider the case that the distributions have support [1, h] for some h. We seek
to learn a mechanism that is optimal up to a 1 −  multiplicative factor in term of revenue. We
show the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose the product distribution D has bounded support [1, h]. Then, for any
0 <  < 1, there is an algorithm that takes O˜(hn−3) samples and learns a mechanism with revenue
at least
(
1−O())Opt (D).
Similar to the case of additive approximation in the previous section, we will prove the theorem
by reducing it to the finite support case. Again, we first introduce a technical lemma showing
that a standard discretization of the value space decreases the optimal revenue by at most a 1− 
multiplicative factor.
Lemma 4.5. Given any product value distribution D′, and D′′ obtained by rounding the values
from D′ down to the closest power of 1− , we have Opt (D′′) ≥ (1− )Opt (D′).
Proof. The lemma follows as a simple corollary of the monotonicity of the optimal revenue (Propo-
sition 3.1). Consider a distribution D′′′ that rounds the values from D′ up to the closest power of
1 − . The difference between D′′′ and D′′ is that the former is rounded up whereas the latter is
rounded down. Thus, effectively D′′′ is just D′′ scaled up by a factor of (1 − )−1. Clearly, the
optimal revenue of D′′ is 1−  times that of D′′′, which by Proposition 3.1 is greater than or equal
to the optimal revenue of D′.
By rounding the values to their closest powers of 1 −  from below, we reduce the problem to
the finite support case with support V = {1, (1− )−1, (1− )−2, . . . , h}, which has size h/. As a
result, we get the following Algorithm 3.
1: Parameters: h > 0 (upper bound of values);  ∈ (0, 1) (multiplicative loss);
γ > 0 (failure probability).
2: Input: m = Θ
(
h−2(n−1 log h log(n log h/) + log γ−1)
)
samples v1, . . . ,vm ∼ D.
3: Run Algorithm 1 with V = {1, (1− )−1, (1− )−2, . . . , h}, samples rounded to the closest
powers of 1− , α = Opt (D), and β = Opt (D) (h and γ remain what they are).
4: Output: The empirical Myerson auction outputted by Algorithm 1, treating any value
as the closest power of 1−  from below.
Algorithm 3: Empirical Myerson (Multiplicative Bound for Bounded-Support Distributions)
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Proof of Theorem 4.4. By Lemma 4.5 and Theorem 4.1 (noting that αhβ−2 = h−2Opt (D)−1 ≤
h−2 since Opt (D) ≥ 1), we get that Algorithm 3 learns an empirical Myerson auction gets revenue
at least
(
1−O())Opt (D) in expectation.
4.4 Regular
In this subsection, we show an O˜
(
n
4
)
upper bound on the sample complexity when the distributions
are regular. The challenge of this case is that the support of the distribution could be unbounded.
The main technical ingredient that overcomes this challenge is to show that we can truncate the
values down to a high enough finite quantity without losing too much revenue. This is captured in
the following lemma, whose proof is deferred to Section 4.4.1.
Lemma 4.6. Suppose 14 ≥  > 0 is a constant. Suppose v¯ ≥ 1Opt (D). Let D¯1, . . . , D¯n be the
distributions obtained by truncating D1, . . . , Dn at v¯, i.e., a sample v¯i from D¯
i is obtained by first
sampling vi from D
i and then letting v¯i = min{vi, v¯}. Then, we have
Opt
(
ΠiD¯
i
) ≥ (1− 4)Opt (D)
Suppose that Opt (D) is known, say, up to a constant factor. Then, Lemma 4.6 implies that it
suffices to consider prices between Opt (D) and 1Opt (D). Further, by the standard multiplicative
discretization in Lemma 4.5, it suffices to consider prices that are powers of 1−. Putting together,
we can restrict ourselves to −1 log(1 ) discretized values. Hence, we can apply Theorem 4.1 with
α = Opt (D), β = Opt (D), h = 1Opt (D), and |V | = −1 log(1 ) to get the desired bound.
In order to instantiate the above approach, we design an algorithm that estimates the optimal
revenue up to a constant factor. To do this, we employ a bootstrapping approach. We consider two
families of simple mechanisms, namely, selling to each buyer separately, and the VCG mechanism
with duplicates.8 These simple mechanisms require relatively few samples to implement and get
a good enough approximation of the optimal revenue of the original problem (e.g., [11]). We run
these simpler mechanisms with Θ(n−1 log n ) samples to find a constant approximation of optimal
revenue using Algorithm 4, whose role is summarized in Lemma 4.7.
Lemma 4.7. With probability 1−O(), we have 18Opt (D) ≤ Apx ≤ 8Opt (D) .
We’ll first prove the following straightforward Lemma:
Lemma 4.8. With probability 1−O(), we have
Opt (D) ≤ SRev ≤ 2nOpt (D)
Proof. By that maxi∈[n]Opt
(
Di
) ≤ Opt (D) ≤ ∑ni=1Opt (Di) and that SRevi is a 2 approxi-
mation of Opt
(
Di
)
, the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. By Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.8, the optimal revenue when the values are
truncated at 1SRev ≥ 1Opt (D), denoted as Opt, is at least
(
1− O())Opt (D). On one hand,
the truncated distributions are also regular. So the expected revenue of running VCG with duplicate
w.r.t. the truncated values, denoted as VCG, is a 2-approximation of the optimal revenue of the
truncated distributions (Theorem 4.4 of [11]), i.e., VCG ≥ 12Opt. On the other hand, we have
VCG ≤ 2Opt since we are running a mechanism with two copies of each buyer. Further, the
revenue from each run of the VCG with duplicate is at most 1SRev ≤ 2n Opt (D) because the
8Another potential approach is to use VCG with monopoly reserves, which also gives similar guarantees.
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values are truncated at 1SRev. Putting together, by Bernstein inequality, with probability 1−O(),
the average revenue from the m1 = Θ(n
−1 log −1) runs of VCG with duplicates are upper and
lower bounded as follows:
Apx ≤ 2VCG ≤ 4Opt ≤ 8Opt (D)
Apx ≥ 12VCG ≥ 14Opt ≥ 18Opt (D)
So the lemma follows.
1: For all i ∈ [n], use O(log n ) samples to compute a 2-approximation of the optimal
revenue when buyer i was the only buyer (e.g., [12]), denoted as SRevi, i.e.,
Opt
(
Di
) ≤ SRevi ≤ 2Opt (Di).
2: Let SRev =
∑n
i=1 SRevi.
3: Let m1 = Θ(n
−1 log −1) and let there be 2m1 fresh samples.
4: Run VCG with two copies of each buyer m1 times, capping the values by
1
SRev.
5: Output the average revenue, denoted as Apx.
Algorithm 4: Computing an O(1) approximation of the optimal revenue
The final algorithm we use is: find an approximation to Opt (D), discretize the values accord-
ingly, and run the Myerson auction on the samples, rounded to the discrete set. This is summarized
in Algorithm 5.
1: Parameters: h > 0 (upper bound of values);  ∈ (0, h] (additive revenue loss);
γ > 0 (failure probability).
2: Input: m = Θ
(
−3(n−1 log(1 ) log(
n
 ) + log γ
−1)
)
samples v1, . . . ,vm ∼ D.
3: Compute Apx using Algorithm 4 with Θ(n−1 log −1) samples.
4: Let V =
{
8
Apx,
8(1−)
 Apx,
8(1−)2
 Apx, . . . ,

8Apx, 0
}
.
5: Run Algorithm 1 with Θ
(
−3(n−1 log(1 ) log(
n
 ) + log γ
−1)
)
fresh samples rounded
down to the closest number in V , α = Opt (D), β = Opt (D), h = 1Opt (D)
(γ remain what it is).
6: Output: The empirical Myerson auction outputted by Algorithm 1, treating any value
as the closest value in |V | from below.
Algorithm 5: Empirical Myerson (Regular Distributions)
Theorem 4.9. Algorithm 5 is a 1−O() approximation.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 (noting that αhβ−2 = O(−3)), Lemma 4.5, and the fact that rounding
values smaller than 8Apx ≤ Opt (D) (Lemma 4.7) down to 0 decreasing the optimal revenue by
at most Opt (D), we get that Algorithm 5 learns an empirical Myerson auction gets revenue at
least
(
1−O())Opt (D) in expectation.
4.4.1 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Note that when n = 1, the lemma follows easily by concavity of the revenue curves of regular
distributions. What is the extra challenge with multiple buyers? If the buyers’ values are all below
the truncation point v¯, the virtual values are the same in both cases and, thus, the revenue is the
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same. If exactly one of the buyers’ value is larger than v¯, the analysis is similar to the n = 1 case.
It remains to bound the revenue when more than one buyers’ values are larger than v¯, in which case
the competition among the buyers may give an extra edge to the untruncated case. It turns out
that truncations are so rare such that the revenue from the third case of the untruncated setting
can be charged to the revenue from the second case of the truncated setting.
Truncations are Rare. Let q¯i = 1−F (v¯) denote the quantile of value v¯ w.r.t. Di. Let φi(qi) and
φ¯i(qi) denote the virtual value at quantile qi w.r.t. D
i and D¯i respectively. Then, φ¯i(qi) = φi(qi) if
q¯i < qi ≤ 1 and v¯ otherwise. It is easy to see that for any i ∈ [n], we have q¯i ≤ . We also show the
following more refined bound on q¯is.
Lemma 4.10. The probability that at least one buyer has value greater than or equal to v¯ is at
most  and is at least (1− )∑i∈[n] q¯i, i.e.,
 ≥ 1−∏i∈[n](1− q¯i) ≥ (1− )∑i∈[n] q¯i
Charging Argument. Note that both Di and D¯i are regular, so Myerson’s auction simply picks
the buyer with the maximum virtual surplus, and the revenue is the virtual welfare thus obtained.
Given a quantile vector q, let H(q) = {i ∈ [n] : qi ≤ q¯i} denote the buyers whose values are higher
than v¯; let L(q) = [n] \H(q) denote the set of buyers whose values are smaller than v¯. We bound
the ratio separately, for the high value buyers and the low value buyers, as below.∫
[0,1]n\∏j [q¯j ,1] maxi φ¯i(qi)dnq ≥ (1− 2)
∫
[0,1]n maxi∈H(q) φi(qi)d
nq, and (2)∫∏
j [q¯j ,1]
maxi φ¯i(qi)d
nq ≥ (1− 2) ∫[0,1]n maxi∈L(q) φi(qi)dnq. (3)
Before we prove Equations 2 and 3 we need the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.11. For any i ∈ [n], we have q¯i ≤ .
Proof. Note that serving buyer i as if he was the only buyer with a reserve price v¯ give revenue q¯iv¯,
which must be less than or equal to the optimal revenue Opt (D). The lemma then follows from
that v¯ ≥ 1Opt (D).
Proof of (2): Note that for any i and any qi < q¯i, φ¯i(qi) = v¯. Thus, the LHS of (2) is lower
bounded by ∫
[0,1]n\∏i[q¯i,1] v¯d
nq =
(
1−
∏
i∈[n]
(1− q¯i)
)
v¯ ≥ (1− )
∑
i∈[n]
q¯iv¯
where the inequality follows by Lemma 4.10. On the other hand, the RHS (omitting the 1 − 2
factor) is upper bounded by∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈H(q)
φi(qi)d
nq ≤
∫
[0,1]n
∑
i∈H(q)
max
{
φi(qi), 0
}
dnq
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∫
[0,q¯i]
max{φi(qi), 0}dqi
Therefore, to show (2), it suffices to show that for every i ∈ [n],
q¯iv¯ ≥ (1− )
∫
qi∈[0,q¯i]
max{φi(qi), 0}
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Let Ri(q) denote the revenue of a single-buyer auction with a reserve price that has quantile q w.r.t.
Di. The LHS of the above is the revenue of a single-buyer auction with reserve price v¯ w.r.t. Di,
i.e., Ri(q¯i). The RHS is the maximum revenue of a single-buyer auction with a reserve price at
least v¯, i.e., maxq∈[0,q¯i]Ri(q). Note that Di’s being regular implies that Ri(q) is a concave function
over [0, 1] and Ri(1) ≥ 0. Thus, we have that Ri(q¯i) ≥ (1 − q¯i) maxq∈[0,q¯i]Ri(q). The inequality
then follows by q¯i ≤  (Lemma 4.11).
Proof of (3): Note that for any q ∈∏j∈[n][q¯j , 1], we have L(q) = [n]. So we can rewrite the LHS
of (3) as follows. ∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
i∈[n]
φi(qi)d
nq =
∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)d
nq
For any q−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, any qi < q¯i ≤ q′i, consider q = (qi,q−i) and q′ = (q′i,q−i). We have that
L(q) ⊂ L(q′), and for any i ∈ L(q), qi = q′i. Thus, maxi∈L(q) φi(qi) ≤ maxi∈L(q′) φi(q′i). Therefore,
we have that∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)d
nq ≥ (1− q¯1)
∫
[0,1]×∏nj=2[q¯j ,1] maxi∈L(q)φi(qi)d
nq
≥ (1− q¯1)(1− q¯2)
∫
[0,1]2×∏nj=3[q¯j ,1] maxi∈L(q)φi(qi)d
nq
≥ . . .
≥
∏
j∈[n]
(1− q¯j)
∫
[0,1]n
max
i∈L(q)
φi(qi)d
nq
Finally, by Lemma 4.10, we have that
∏
j∈[n](1− q¯j) ≥ 1− . Putting together proves (3).
4.5 Monotone Hazard Rate
In this subsection, we show an O˜
(
n
3
)
upper bound on the sample complexity when the distributions
have monotone hazard rate. The algorithm is almost identical to that for regular distributions,
except that we have a better tail bound due to the assumption of monotone hazard rate. In
particular, we will make use of the extreme value theorem by Cai and Daskalakis [5].
Lemma 4.12 (Theorem 18 of [5]). Suppose 14 ≥  > 0 is a constant. Suppose v¯ ≥ log(1 )Opt (D).
Let D¯1, . . . , D¯n be the distributions obtained by truncating D1, . . . , Dn at v¯, i.e., a sample v¯i from
D¯i is obtained by first sampling vi from D
i and then letting v¯i = min{vi, v¯}. Then, we have
Opt
(
ΠiD¯
i
) ≥ (1−O())Opt (D)
Theorem 4.13. Algorithm 6 is a 1−O() approximation.
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 (noting that αhβ−2 = O(−2 log(1 ))), Lemma 4.5, and the fact that round-
ing values smaller than 8Apx ≤ Opt (D) (Lemma 4.7) down to 0 decreasing the optimal revenue
by at most Opt (D), we get that Algorithm 5 learns an empirical Myerson auction gets revenue
at least
(
1−O())Opt (D) in expectation.
17
1: Parameters: h > 0 (upper bound of values);  ∈ (0, h] (additive revenue loss);
γ > 0 (failure probability).
2: Input: m = Θ
(
−3(n−1 log(1 ) log(
n
 ) + log γ
−1)
)
samples v1, . . . ,vm ∼ D.
3: Compute Apx using Algorithm 4 with Θ(n−1 log −1) samples.
4: Let V =
{
8 log(1 )Apx, 8(1− ) log(1 )Apx, 8(1− )2 log(1 )Apx, . . . , 8Apx, 0
}
.
5: Run Algorithm 1 with Θ
(
−2 log(1 )(n
−1 log(1 ) log(
n
 ) + log γ
−1)
)
fresh samples rounded
down to the closest number in V , α = Opt (D), β = Opt (D), h = log(1 )Opt (D)
(γ remain what it is).
6: Output: The empirical Myerson auction outputted by Algorithm 1, treating any value
as the closest value in |V | from below.
Algorithm 6: Empirical Myerson (MHR Distributions)
5 Signal Auctions Upper Bounds
5.1 Single Agent
In this subsection we sketch a proof of the O
( log(1/)
q()3
)
upper bound for the Signals model, for n = 1.
Our auction is simply a posted price. The main challenge is the scarcity of samples with the same
signal as the buyer (in fact, there might be none). The idea is to find an auxiliary distribution such
that (1) we have enough samples to find a nearly optimal price for it, and (2) it is stochastically
dominated by the buyer’s prior. Then, we can lower bound the revenue of the auction with the
optimal revenue of the auxiliary distribution. To this end, we consider a number of signals in
the sample that are just below the signal of the bidder, and use the mixture of the corresponding
distributions as our auxiliary distribution. The price posted is the best price for the empirical
distribution of values corresponding to these signals, guarded against using too few of these values.
The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 7.
1: Samples: (vˆ1, σˆ1), (vˆ2, σˆ2), . . . , (vˆm, σˆm), where σˆ1 ≥ σˆ2 ≥ · · · ≥ σˆm.
2: Parameter: 
3: Input: Signal σ (the value v is unobserved); suppose σˆk ≥ σ ≥ σˆk+1.
4: Auction: Let c = Θ(−3 log −1), and ` = min {c,m− k}.
Post the -guarded empirical reserve price with respect to vk+1, vk+2, . . . , vk+`, defined as:
pemp
def
= arg max
vˆk+j :`≤j≤`
vˆk+j ·
∣∣{vˆk+i : vˆk+i ≥ vˆk+j , 1 ≤ i ≤ `}∣∣
Algorithm 7: Computing a 1−Θ() approximation of the optimal revenue
In the analysis, we divide the realization of all the random variables, (vˆj , σˆj) for j ∈ [m], and
the eventual realization (v, σ) of the bidder, into 3 stages as follows.
1. Sample m+ 1 signals σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′m+1 i.i.d. from FD,σ; suppose σ′1 ≥ σ′2 ≥ · · · ≥ σ′m+1.
2. Pick i ∈ [m+1] uniformly at random and let σ = σ′i; let σˆ1, σˆ2, . . . , σˆm be the other m signals.
3. Sample m+ 1 values, vˆj ∼ Dσˆj and v ∼ Dσ , independently.
We lower bound the revenue of the auction successively over the randomization in the different
stages. Using revenue monotonicity and the stochastic dominance between signals, we lower bound
the revenue over the randomness of the last stage (Lemma 5.2). The lemma is similar to Theorem 3.6
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of [12] with the extra complication that the sample values are not iid from the auxiliary distribution.
Next, we lower bound the revenue over the randomness of the last two stages (Lemma 5.3), and
finally over the randomness of all three stages (Lemma 5.4). The revenue guarantee then follows
from Definition 1.
Let Rev (p,D) denote the expected revenue of posting price p when the underlying distribution
is D.
Definition 2 (Truncated distributions). Given any distribution D over [0,+∞) and any 0 < δ < 1,
let Dtruncδ denote the distribution obtained by replacing the entire top δ of the probability mass of
D with a point mass. Formally, if F is the c.d.f. of D then the c.d.f. of Dtruncδ is identical to F for
all values less than F−1(1− δ), and the c.d.f of Dtruncδ at F−1(1− δ) is 1.
Let Dˆ denote the mixed distribution of Dσˆk+1 , Dσˆk+2 , . . . , Dσˆk+` . That is, if we want to draw
a value from Dˆ, we first sample i from {1, 2, . . . , `} uniformly at random, and then draw a value
from Dσˆk+i . It is easy to verify the following claims:
Claim 5.1. Dσ  Dˆtrunc  Dσˆk+` trunc .
Claim 5.2. If D  D′, then for any price p ≥ 0 we have Rev (p,D) ≥ Rev (p,D′).
Claim 5.3. Opt (Dtrunc ) ≥ (1− )Opt (D), for all regular distributions D.
We first need to show that:
Lemma 5.1.
E
[
Rev
(
pemp, Dˆ
trunc

)
|σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ
] ≥ (1− )2Opt(Dˆtrunc ) ,
where the expectation is over the random draws of values from the Dσˆi’s.
Proof. For the purposes of this proof we’ll relax notation and not write the conditioning on
σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ. Let p
∗ be the optimal price for Dˆtrunc , i.e. Rev
(
p∗, Dˆtrunc
)
= Opt
(
Dˆtrunc
)
. Also
let Eˆtrunc be the uniform distribution over V = {vˆk+j : ` ≤ j ≤ `}, where vˆk+j is drawn from
Dσˆk+j . Using standard Chernoff bounds it’s easy to see that w.h.p.:
Rev
(
p∗, Eˆtrunc
)
≥ (1− )Rev
(
p∗, Dˆtrunc
)
, (4)
i.e. expected revenue of p∗ in Eˆtrunc is a good estimate of it’s revenue in Dˆtrunc . Using a similar
proof (plus union bound) we can show that the same is true for all vˆk+z ∈ V , and thus:
Rev
(
pemp, Dˆ
trunc

)
≥ (1− )Rev
(
pemp, Eˆ
trunc

)
, (5)
Finally, we’ll show that the value in V with the highest revenue in Eˆtrunc , i.e. pemp, has revenue in
Eˆtrunc at least the revenue of p
∗ in Eˆtrunc :
Rev
(
pemp, Eˆ
trunc

)
≥ Rev
(
p∗, Eˆtrunc
)
(6)
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Eˆtrunc is uniform over discrete values; the optimal (in terms of revenue) posted price chosen out
of those values is also optimal overall. Putting it all together we get that w.h.p.:
Rev
(
pemp, Dˆ
trunc

)
≥ (1− )Rev
(
pemp, Eˆ
trunc

)
Equation: 5
≥ (1− )Rev
(
p∗, Eˆtrunc
)
Equation: 6
≥ (1− )2Rev
(
p∗, Dˆtrunc
)
Equation: 4
= (1− )2Opt
(
Dˆtrunc
)
The main lemma for this stage is the following:
Lemma 5.2.
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ
] ≥ (1− )3Opt(Dσˆk+`) .
Proof.
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ
] ≥ E [Rev(pemp, Dˆtrunc ) |σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ] (Claims 5.2 and 5.1)
≥ (1− )2Opt
(
Dˆtrunc
)
(Lemma 5.1)
≥ (1− )2Opt
(
Dσˆk+`
trunc

)
(Theorem 2.1 and Claim 5.1)
≥ (1− )3Opt
(
Dσˆk+`
)
(Claim 5.3)
Next, we lower bound the revenue of the above auction over the random- ness of the last two
stages:
Lemma 5.3.
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1
] ≥ (1− )3
m+ 1
m+1∑
i=`+1
Opt
(
Dσ
′
i
)
Proof. Note that
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1
]
=
1
m+ 1
m+1∑
i=1
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1, σ = σˆi
]
For any i ≤ m+ 1− `, by Lemma 5.2, we get that
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1, σ = σˆi
] ≥ (1− )3Opt(Dσ′i+`)
Therefore, we have
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1
] ≥ (1− )3
m+ 1
m+1−`∑
i=1
Opt
(
Dσ
′
i+`
)
=
(1− )3
m+ 1
m+1∑
i=`+1
Opt
(
Dσ
′
i
)
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Finally, we will lower bound the revenue of the above auction over the randomness of all three
stages.
Lemma 5.4.
E
[
Rev (pemp, D
σ)
] ≥ (1− )3 ∫ F−1D,σ(1− cm+1)
0
Opt (Dσ) dFD,σ
Proof. Recall that σ′1, . . . , σ′m+1 are i.i.d. from FD,σ. Thus, we have
1
m+ 1
m+1∑
i=1
Opt
(
Dσ
′
i
)
=
∫ 1
0
Opt (Dσ) dFD,σ
Let us compare the LHS of the above with the RHS of (5.3) (removing the (1 − )3 factor), i.e.,
1
m+1
∑m+1
i=`+1Opt
(
Dσ
′
i
)
. The latter drops ` of the m + 1 signals in the summation and, thus,
effectively drops `m+1 of the probability mass in the expectation. Recall that D
σ stochastically
dominates Dσ
′
for any σ ≥ σ′. So the worst-case scenario is dropping the contributions from
signals σ ∈ [1− cm+1 , 1]. The lemma then follows.
5.2 Multiple agents
In this subsection, we show how to solve the multi-agent problem in the Signals model, building
on techniques in the single-agent problem and in the non-iid model of the multi-agent problem.
Formally, we prove the following sample complexity upper bound.
Theorem 5.5 (Upper bound for multiple agents). There exists a mechanism for selling to n agents
in the Signals model, that has a sample complexity, against regular distributions which have a q-
bounded tail in the signal space, of
O
(
n2
q()4
log2
n

)
High-level ideas. We combine the ideas from the single-agent signal case (Section 5.1) and the
multi-agent no-signal case (Section 4). For each agent, consider ` = Θ(n
2
4
log n ) sample signals that
are closest to the agent’s signal from below, and using the corresponding ` sample values in place
of the actual samples from his true distribution, we run the the empirical Myerson’s auction with
preconditioning in Section 4. Like in the single agent case, we would like to show that the expected
revenue of the auction is almost as good as the optimal revenue when each agent’s distribution is
replaced by the distribution whose signal is the `-th closest to the agent’s signal from below. Then,
we can use the small tail assumption in the signal space to show that the auction gives nearly
optimal revenue.
There are two caveats, one in the algorithm and one in the analysis. First, the implementation
of the empirical Myerson’s auction in Section 4 uses the VCG mechanism with duplicate agents
to estimate the optimal revenue up to a constant factor, exploiting regularity of the distributions.
The algorithm in the Signals model, however, needs to estimate the optimal revenue when each
agent’s distribution is replaced by the mixture of the ` distributions whose signals are closest to the
agent’s signal from below. The mixture of regular distributions is not necessarily regular. Thus,
we turn to a coarser n-approximation.
Further, the analysis for the single-agent case uses a strong notion of revenue monotonicity,
which holds regardless of the mechanism being used.9 With multiple agents, we need to make do
9This is true in the single agent case since these mechanisms are posted price mechanisms.
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with the weaker notion of revenue monotonicity in Theorem 2.1, which only holds for the optimal
auction for the dominated distribution. This is still not directly applicable because we can only
find the optimal auction for the empirical distribution w.r.t. the mixture of the ` distributions
whose signals are closest to the agent’s signal from below, which is not necessarily dominated by
the true distribution for the agent’s signal, due to the randomness in the sample values. To this
end, we further introduce a coupling argument to show that the optimal auction for the empirical
distribution gives essentially the same revenue guarantee.
1: Samples: (vˆ1, σˆ1), (vˆ2, σˆ2), . . . , (vˆm, σˆm), where σˆ1 ≥ σˆ2 ≥ · · · ≥ σˆm.
2: Parameter: 
3: Input: For each buyer i, signal σi (the value vi is unobserved); suppose σˆki ≥ σi ≥ σˆki+1.
4: Auction:
5: Let ` = Θ(n
2
4
log2 n ).
6: Let D¯i denote the mixture of Dσˆki+1 , Dσˆki+2 , . . . , Dσˆki+` ; let F¯ i denote the corresponding
CDF.
7: For all i ∈ [n], compute a 2-approximation of maxp:F¯ i(p)≤ 1
2
p
(
1− F¯ i(p)), denoted as SRevi.
(i.e., 12SRevi ≤ maxp:F¯ i(p)≤ 12 p
(
1− F¯ i(p)) ≤ SRevi)
8: Let Apx =
∑n
i=1 SRevi.
9: Let V = {2Apx, 2(1−) Apx, 2(1−)
2
 Apx, . . . ,

n2
Apx, 0
}
.
10: For each buyer i, round vˆki+1, . . . , vˆki+` down to the closest value in V ;
let vˆi1, . . . , vˆ
i
` denote the rounded values;
let E¯i denote the uniform distribution over vˆi1 . . . , vˆ
i
`.
11: Run Myerson auction w.r.t. E¯ = E¯1 × · · · × E¯n.
Algorithm 8: Memp, a 1−O() approximately optimal signal auction for multiple agents
Algorithm. The algorithm is presented in Algorithm 8. We can implement line 7 using the
approach in, for example, [12], with an extra complication that vˆki+1, . . . , vˆki+` are not iid samples
from D¯i. Note that this extra complication is the same problem that we have in the single-buyer
case (Lemma 5.1) and, thus, can be handled the same way. We will omit the details.
Analysis. Similar to the single-buyer case, we divide the realization of all the random variables
into 3 stages as follows.
1. Sample m+ n signals σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′m+n i.i.d. from FD,σ; suppose σ′1 ≥ σ′2 ≥ · · · ≥ σ′m+n.
2. Pick a subset of n indices i1 6= · · · 6= in ∈ [m+n] uniformly at random and let σj = σ′ij for all
j ∈ [n]; let σˆ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σˆm be the other m signals. (Note that the ki in Algorithm 7 is fixed
by the end of this stage, and is equal to ji − 1.)
3. Sample m+ n values, vˆj ∼ Dσˆj for j ∈ [m] and vi ∼ Dσi for i ∈ [n], independently.
In the following discussion, let Di = Dσki+` with CDF F i and let D = D1× · · ·×Dn. For notation
convenient, let Di be a point mass at 0 for i > m
Lemma 5.6. With probability 1−O(), 12Opt (D) ≤ Apx ≤ nOpt
(
D¯
)
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Proof. The first inequality holds because
SRevi ≥ max
p:F¯ i(p)≤ 1
2
p
(
1− F¯ i(p)) (definition of SRevi)
≥ max
p:F i(p)≤ 1
2
p
(
1− F i(p)) (F¯ i  F i)
≥ 1
2
max
p≥0
p
(
1− F i(p)) (regularity of Di)
and
∑
i∈[n] maxp≥0 p
(
1 − F i(p)) = ∑i∈[n]Opt (Di) ≥ Opt (D). The second inequality holds
because SRevi ≤ Opt
(
D¯
)
.
Lemma 5.7. With probability 1−O(), we have
Opt
(
D¯
) ≥ (1−O())Opt (D)−O()Opt (D) .
Proof. By Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 4.6, truncating D at 2Apx ≥ 1Opt (D) decreases the optimal
revenue by at most at 1 − O() factor. Further, by Lemma 4.5, rounding values to the closest
power of 1−  decreases the optimal revenue by at most another 1 −  factor. Finally, by Lemma
5.6 rounding all values less than 
n2
Apx ≤ nOpt
(
D¯
)
to 0 decreases the revenue by at most
Opt
(
D¯
)
.
As a simple corollary of the above lemma and Theorem 2.2, 10 we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. With probability 1−O(), we have
Opt
(
E¯
) ≥ (1−O())Opt (D)−O()Opt (D) .
Next, we prove the key lemma that lower bounds the expected revenue of the empirical Myerson
auction w.r.t. E¯ if we run it on D, conditioned on the realization of signals.
Lemma 5.9. With probability 1−O() (over randomness of the sample values), we have
E
[
Rev (Memp,D) |σˆ1, . . . , σˆm, σ1, . . . , σn
] ≥ (1−O())Opt (D)−O()Opt (D) .
Proof. Let us first explain the proof structure. If D stochastically dominates E¯, then the lemma
follows by Lemma 5.8 and revenue monotonicity (Theorem 2.1). However, despite the fact that D
stochastically dominates D¯, it does not necessarily dominates E¯ due to randomness in the sample
values. To get around this obstacle, we designed for each buyer i a set of random values coupled
with the sample values vˆki+j , 1 ≤ j ≤ `, and the uniform distribution over them Ei such that (1) E
stochastically dominate E¯, and (2) the revenue of any optimal mechanism w.r.t. some distribution
over the set of discretized values when we run it on E is a 1 − O() approximation of its revenue
on D. Then, we can show that the revenue of the empirical Myerson auction (w.r.t. E¯) on D is at
least a 1−O() fraction of its revenue on E, which is greater than or equal to its revenue on E¯.
Concretely, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ `, let qˆj =
(
1 − F σˆki+j (vˆki+j)
)
be the quantile of vˆki+j w.r.t.
Dσˆki+j ; let v˜j be the value with quantile qˆj w.r.t. D
i. Note that qˆj is uniform from [0, 1] over
random realization of vˆki+j conditioned on σˆki+j . So v˜j , 1 ≤ j ≤ `, are i.i.d. samples from Di. Let
Ei be the uniform distribution over v˜j , 1 ≤ j ≤ `.
10Again, there is an extra complication that the sample values are not iid from the mixture distributions, which
can be handled using the approach in Lemma 5.1.
23
By our construction and that Di stochastically dominates Dσˆki+j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ `, we
get that E stochastically dominates E¯. Further, by revenue monotonicity (Theorem 2.1), we
have Rev (Memp,E) ≥ Rev
(
Memp, E¯
)
. Recall that we can alter E such that the optimal auc-
tion is unique (Remark 2.1). Thus, by Theorem 2.2, we have that Rev (Memp,D) ≥
(
1 −
O()
)
Rev (Memp,E). Putting together with Lemma 5.8 proves the lemma.
As a simple corollary, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.10. With probability 1−O(), we have
E
[
Rev (Memp,D)
] ≥ (1−O())E [Opt (D) ]−O()E [Opt (D) ] .
Finally, we relate E
[
Opt (D)
]
with E
[
Opt (D)
]
by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 5.11. Over the randomness of all three stages, we have
E
[
Opt (D)
] ≥ (1− )E [Opt (D) ]
Proof. Given Lemma 5.10, it suffices to relate E
[
Opt (D)
]
with E
[
Opt (D)
]
. First, we consider
the expectation over the randomness of the last two stages. Conditioned on the realization of
signals σ′1, . . . , σ′m+n, over the randomness of the choice of i1, . . . , in and random realization of the
corresponding values, we can write the expectation of the optimal revenue w.r.t. D as follows.
E
[
Opt (D) |σ′1, . . . , σ′m+n
]
=
1(
m+n
n
) ∑
{i1,...,in}⊂[m+n]
Opt
(
D
σ′i1+` × · · · ×Dσ′in+`
)
=
1(
m+n
n
) ∑
{i1,...,in}⊂{`+1,...,`+m+n}
Opt
(
D
σ′i1 × · · · ×Dσ′in
)
≥ 1(m+n
n
) ∑
{i1,...,in}⊂{`+1,...,m+n}
Opt
(
D
σ′i1 × · · · ×Dσ′in
)
Next, we consider the expectation of over the randomness of the first stage. Note that ` ≤
q()m + n. Taking expectation over random realization of σ′1, . . . , σ′m+n, the RHS of the above
inequality is lower bounded by
Eσ1,...,σn∼FD,σ [1{∀i ∈ [n], FD,σ(σi) ≤ 1− q()}Opt (Dσ1 × · · · ×Dσn)]
By the small tail assumption in signal space (Definition 1), this is at least (1− )E [Opt (D) ]. So
the lemma follows.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. It follows from Lemma 5.10 and 5.11.
5.3 Lower bounds for n = 1
Theorem 5.12. The sample complexity of any single agent mechanism against any q-bounded
distribution in the Signals model is
Ω
(
log (1/q())
4
)
.
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Proof. Our instance will have
log 1
α
2 log(1−18) + 1 conditional distributions. Let N =
log 1
α
2 log(1−18) ≈ logα .
For the i-th conditional distribution (that is the distribution conditioned on signal σi) we will have
two candidate distributions Dσi1 and D
σi
2 , and it will be impossible to extract high revenue from
that conditional, without seeing at least 1
3
samples (from that conditional), even when having
exact knowledge of the rest of the distributions. The expected revenue from each conditional will
be approximately the same, thus, in order for a pricing algorithm to achieve high expected revenue
overall, it will have to achieve high expected revenue in most of the conditionals.
Our construction works as follows: for each i ∈ [0, N ] let
ci =
1
(1− 20)2i
.
Dσi1 is the distribution with c.d.f
F i1 (x) = 1−
ci
x+ ci
and p.d.f
f i1 =
ci
(x+ ci)
2 .
Dσi2 has c.d.f
F i2 (x) =
1−
ci
x+ci
if x ∈
[
0, (1−20)ci20
]
1− ci(1−20)2x−ci(1−20) if x >
(1−20)ci
20
and p.d.f.
f i2 (x) =

ci
(x+ci)
2 if x ∈
[
0, (1−20)ci20
]
ci(1−20)2
(x−ci(1−20))2 if x >
(1−20)ci
20
where 0 = 9.
The revenue curves as a function of the price are
Ri1 (x) =
xci
x+ ci
Ri2 (x) =

xci
x+ci
if x ∈
[
0, (1−20)ci20
]
xci(1−20)2
x−ci(1−20) if x >
(1−20)ci
20
and as a function of the quantile space
Ri1 (q) = ci (1− q)
Ri2 (q) =
{
ci
(
(1− 20)2 + q (1− 20)
)
if q ∈ [0, 20]
ci (1− q) if q ∈ [20, 1]
Conditioned on seeing signal σi the Myerson revenue is ci for D
σi
1 and ci (1− 20) for Dσi2 . Notice
that both Dσi1 and D
σi
2 first-order stochastically dominate both D
σi−1
1 and D
σi−1
2 (and are dominated
by the Dσi+1 ’s). Also, we have that c0 = 1 and cN = (1− 20)−2N = (1− 18)−2
1
2
log1−18
1
α = α,
thus the gap between the highest and the lowest revenue is α.
In order to make the expected revenue from each conditional approximately the same, we set
the probability pi of seeing signal σi equal to γ · 1ci , where γ is the normalizing factor, i.e.
γ =
1∑N
j=0
1
cj
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.
The optimal expected revenue is upper bounded by:
OPT =
N∑
i=0
piOpt (D
σi) ≤
N∑
i=0
cipi = γ(N + 1)
Dropping pN in probability mass in signal space results in dropping about γ in terms of revenue,
i.e. 1N of the total revenue. Dropping pN+pN−1 results in dropping a
2
N fraction of the total revenue,
and so on; thus, in order to drop an  fraction of the total revenue, and since N is approximately
logα
 , we need to drop
∑N
i=N−logα pi in probability. This simplifies to(
(1− 2)
4(1− )
)2
· 1
α
· 1
α2 log(1−2)
.
Using this, we can get the following relation between q() and α:
logα ≈ log
(
1
q()
)
(7)
Claim 5.4. Any pricing algorithm that is (1 − ) approximate for this instance must be (1 − 3)
approximate for at least half of the signals.
Proof. Assume that we have a (1 − ) approximate algorithm, and there exists a set of signals A
such that |A| > N+12 and for every signal σi ∈ A: E [R|σi] < (1− 3)Opt (Dσi). We will show that
the total expected revenue R of the algorithm is less than (1− ) of OPT .
R =
N∑
i=0
pi E [R|σi] =
∑
i∈A
pi E [R|σi] +
∑
i/∈A
pi E [R|σi]
<
∑
i∈A
(1− 3) piOpt (Dσi) +
∑
i/∈A
piOpt (D
σi) = OPT − 3
∑
i∈A
piOpt (D
σi)
< OPT − 3|A| (1− 20) γ
Remember that γ ≥ 1N+1OPT , so 3|A| (1− 20) γ ≥ 32 (1− 20) OPT > OPT .
Thus we have:
R < (1− )OPT
a contradiction.
We will proceed to show that in order to (1− 3) approximate the revenue for a given signal σi,
any pricing algorithm requires Ω
(
1
3
)
samples from that signal. Thus, since any (1−) approximate
pricing algorithm requires Ω
(
1
3
)
approximate in at least N+12 >
log 1
α
4 log(1−18) of the signals, the total
number of signals required is Ω
(
log 1
α
2 log(1−18)
1
3
)
, which is Ω
(
logα
4
)
, and thus using equation 7 we
get the desired lower bound for q-bounded distributions.
Lemma 5.13. Any pricing algorithm that is (1 − 3) approximate for both Dσi1 and Dσi2 requires
Ω
(
1
3
)
samples from the distribution conditioned on σi.
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Proof. First, notice that even exact knowledge of the distributions conditioned on the rest of the
signals does not help here; we’re back to a one-distribution problem.
We will follow a similar approach to [12]: we will first bound the KL divergence of Dσi1 and
Dσi2 , then show that the (1− 9) = (1− 0) optimal price sets are disjoint. We state here, without
proofs, a theorem and a lemma from [12] that we use:
Theorem 5.14 (Theorem 4.2 from [12]). If value distributions D1 and D2 have disjoint (1− 3′)
approximate price sets, and there is a pricing algorithm that is (1 − ′) approximate for both D1
and D2, then the algorithm uses at least
4
9
1
DKL(D1‖D2)+DKL(D2‖D1) samples.
Lemma 5.15 (Lemma 4.4 from [12]). If distributions D1 and D2 with densities f1 and f2 satisfy
that (1 + ′)−1 ≤ f1(ω)f2(ω) ≤ (1 + ′) for every ω ∈ Ω, and there is a subset of outcomes Ω′ such that
p1(ω) = p2(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω′, then
DKL (D1‖D2) +DKL (D2‖D1) ≤ (′)2
(
1− p1
(
Ω′
))
Notice that:
f i1
f i2
=
1 if x ∈
[
0, (1−20)ci20
]
ci
ci(1−20)2 ·
(x−ci(1−20))2
(x+ci)
2 if x >
(1−20)ci
20
Thus it holds that
f i1
f i2
∈
[
(1− 20)2 , (1− 20)2
]
, and thus
f i1
f i2
∈
[(
1 + 01−20
)−1
,
(
1 + 01−20
)]
.
Dσi1 and D
σi
2 are identical for x ≤ (1−20)ci20 . In quantile space, this corresponds to q ≥ 20.
Thus, by applying Lemma 5.15 we have that:
DKL (D
σi
1 ‖Dσi2 ) +DKL (Dσi2 ‖Dσi1 ) ≤
(
0
1− 20
)2
20 =
230
(1− 20)2
(8)
Moreover, the (1− 0) price sets are disjoint, by comparing the revenue as a function of the
price:
Ri1(x) ≥ (1− 0)ci iff x ≥
ci(1− 0)
0
and
Ri2(x) ≥ (1− 0)(1− 20)ci iff x ∈
[
(1− 30 + 220)ci
30 − 220
,
ci(1− 0)(1− 20)
0
]
By combining equation 8 with the above observation, and Theorem 5.14 (′ = 3) we get the
desired bound.
6 Extensions
In this section, we will explain how to use the techniques developed in this paper to show sample
complexity upper bounds for several natural extensions of the settings discussed in the main text.
A summary of the results in the extended settings is presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Next, we
will present a brief introduction of these extensions. Then, in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2, we will
sketch the key differences in the algorithm and the analysis of the extensions compared to those in
the main text.
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Setting
Sample Complexity
Regular [1, h] Bounded
Single-parameter, matroid O˜(n−4) O˜(nh−3)
Single-parameter, downward-closed O˜(n2−4) O˜(nh−3)
VCG with individual reserves O˜(n−3) O˜(nh−2)
Table 2: A summary of the sample complexity upper bounds in extended settings of the non-iid
model using our techniques
Setting Sample Complexity
Single-parameter, downward-closed O(n2−4q()−1 log2 n )
VCG with individual reserves O(n−3q()−1 log n )
Table 3: A summary of the sample complexity upper bounds in extended settings of the signal
model using our techniques
Matroid Constraint. In this setting, the seller may serve a subset of buyers S that is indepen-
dent w.r.t. to a matroid (e.g., [11]). Let M denote the set of subsets of buyers that can be served
simultaneously.
Downward-closed Constraint. In this setting, the subsets of buyers that the seller can serve
simultaneously is downward-closed, i.e., if serving a subset of buyers S is feasible then serving any
subsets of S is also feasible. We will assume without loss of generality that serving any single buyer
is feasible. Again, let M denote the set of subsets of buyers that can be served simultaneously. For
regular distributions, the key technical ingredient is showing that Lemma 4.6 generalizes to any
single-parameter mechanism design problem with downward-closed constraint and regular value
distributions. The proof is deferred to Section 6.3.
Lemma 6.1 (Generalized Lemma 4.6). Consider any downward-closed constraint M. Suppose
1
4 ≥  > 0 is a constant. Suppose v¯ ≥ 1Opt (D). Let D¯1, . . . , D¯n be the distributions obtained by
truncating D1, . . . , Dn at v¯, i.e., a sample v¯i from D¯
i is obtained by first sampling vi from D
i and
then letting v¯i = min{vi, v¯}. Then, we have
Opt
(
ΠiD¯
i
) ≥ (1− 4)Opt (D)
VCG with Reserves. It is also natural to consider simpler classes of mechanisms such as the
VCG mechanism with individual reserve prices considered by Hartline and Roughgarden [11]. We
may ask what is the number of samples sufficient/necessary to estimate a set of reserve prices that
obtain a 1−  fraction of the optimal revenue within this family of mechanisms.
MHR Distributions. If the distributions are not only regular, but also satisfy the MHR con-
dition, it may be possible to save an  factor in the sample complexity in these extensions similar
to the single-item case in the main text. However, doing so would require an appropriate general-
ization of the extreme value theorem of Cai and Daskalakis [5] when the seller can serve multiple
bidders. This is beyond the scope of this paper so we leave it as an open question.
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6.1 Non-iid Model
Single-parameter Problem under Matroid Constraint. For regular distributions, the algo-
rithm, the sample complexity analysis in Section 4, and the same upper bound of O(n−4 log2 n )
generalize straightforwardly to this setting, noting that the VCG mechanism with duplicates is a
2-approximation not only for selling a single item but also for any single parameter problem in this
setting, and that Lemma 4.6 generalizes (i.e., Lemma 6.1).
For [1, h] bounded distributions, the proof is identical to that of the single-item case, noting
that the realized revenue of any auction is still upper bounded by h times the optimal revenue.
Single-parameter Problem under Downward-closed Constraint. For regular distribu-
tions, the algorithm and the analysis for this case are essentially the same as the matroid case,
with only one caveat: it is not clear whether the VCG mechanism with duplicates is a con-
stant factor approximation. Thus, we will resort to SRev in Algorithm 4 instead of Apx as
our coarser estimation of the optimal revenue, and change the set of discretized values in Algo-
rithm 5 to V = {2SRev , 2(1−)SRev , 2(1−)
2SRev
 , . . . ,
SRev
n2
} accordingly. Note that SRev is only an
n-approximation. As a result, the largest discretized value could be up to n times larger than the
expected revenue (in contrast, the largest discretized value is only O(1 ) times larger than the ex-
pected revenue in the matroid case). Thus, the number of samples needed to estimate the expected
revenue according to Bernstein’s inequality is O(n) times larger than that in the matroid case.
For [1, h] bounded distributions, the proof is again identical to that of the single-item case,
noting that the realized revenue of any auction is still upper bounded by h times the optimal
revenue.
VCG with Reserves. The algorithm and the analysis follows the same framework as those for
Myerson’s auction in Section 4. The only difference in the algorithm is that instead of running
Myerson’s auction w.r.t. the empirical product distribution E (line 6 of Algorithm 5), we will find
the best reserve prices that maximize the revenue of VCG mechanism with reserves. It is not clear
how to implement this step in polynomial time so our sample complexity bound for this case is
information theoretic. To get computational efficiency, it suffices to design a poly-time algorithm
that computes the best reserve prices when the number of candidate prices is polynomial. We leave
this as an interesting future direction.
For regular distributions, the sample complexity upper bound we can prove for VCG with
reserves is O(n−3 log n ), which is better than the bound for Myerson’s auction by an  factor. The
improvement comes from the fact that given a set V of finitely many prices, the number of different
VCG mechanisms with reserves is only |V |n; in contrast, the number of different Myerson’s auction
is roughly (|V |n)|V |n as shown in Section 4. Recall that the sample complexity upper bound using
our approach is proportional to the logarithm of the number of candidate mechanisms. Thus, the
sample complexity upper bound we get for VCG with reserves is |V | ≈ O˜(1 ) times better than that
of Myerson’s auction.
For [1, h] bounded distributions, we get the same factor  improvement using essentially the
same argument.
6.2 Signal Model
The sample complexity bounds of the extended settings in the signal model follow directly by the
results in the previous subsection and the techniques in Section 5 (i.e., for each buyer, use the
sample values corresponding to the ` signals closest to the buyer’s signal from below in place of the
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actual samples from the buyer’s prior, and run the algorithm in the non-iid model). Note that in
the signal model, we need to estimate the optimal revenue w.r.t. a mixture of regular distributions,
which is not necessarily regular. Thus, unlike the non-iid model, we will not be able to use the VCG
mechanism with duplicates to get a better approximation of the optimal revenue and better sample
complexity upper bounds even if the feasibility constraint is a matroid. Therefore, we have the same
sample complexity upper bound for selling a single item, matroid constraint, and downward-closed
constraint.
6.3 Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let q¯i = 1− F (v¯) denote the quantile of value v¯ w.r.t. Di. Let φi(qi) and φ¯i(qi) denote the virtual
value at quantile qi w.r.t. D
i and D¯i respectively. Then,
φ¯i(qi) =
{
φi(qi) if q¯i < qi ≤ 1;
v¯ if 0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯i.
We first develop the following upper bounds on q¯1, . . . , q¯n.
Lemma 6.2. For any i ∈ [n], we have q¯i ≤ .
Proof. Note that serving buyer i as if he was the only buyer with a reserve price v¯ gives revenue
q¯iv¯, which must be less than or equal to the optimal revenue Opt (D). The lemma then follows
from that v¯ ≥ 1Opt (D).
Lemma 6.3. The probability that at least one buyer has value greater than or equal to v¯ is at most
 and is at least (1− )∑i∈[n] q¯i, i.e.,
 ≥ 1−
∏
i∈[n]
(1− q¯i) ≥ (1− )
∑
i∈[n]
q¯i
Proof. If the mechanism serves at most one buyer and runs the second-price auction with reserve
price v¯ gets revenue
(
1−∏i∈[n](1− q¯i))v¯, which must be less than or equal to the optimal revenue
Opt (D). Since v¯ ≥ 1Opt (D), we get that 1−
∏
i∈[n](1− q¯i) ≤ .
As a result, we get that
∏
i∈[n](1− q¯i) ≥ 1− . Therefore, we have
1−
∏
i∈[n]
(1− q¯i) =
∑
i∈[n]
q¯i
∏
j 6=i
(1− q¯j) ≥
∑
i∈[n]
q¯i
∏
j∈[n]
(1− q¯j) ≥ (1− )
∑
i∈[n]
q¯i
Note that both Di and D¯i are regular. Myerson auction simply serves a subset of the buyers
that maximizes the virtual surplus. So we have (recall that M is the set of independent sets of the
matroid)
Opt (D) =
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈M
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq
and
Opt
(
D¯
)
=
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈M
∑
i∈S
φ¯i(qi)d
nq
Given a quantile vector q, let H(q) = {i ∈ [n] : qi ≤ q¯i} denote the buyers whose values are higher
than v¯; let L(q) = [n] \ H(q) denote the set of buyers whose values are smaller than v¯. We can
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divide the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction into two parts, the revenue from high value buyers
and one from low value buyers. We will upper bound them separately.
Opt (D) ≤
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈H(q)
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq +
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈L(q)
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq
We will also divide the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction w.r.t. the truncated distributions into
two parts, the revenue when there are at least one high value buyer, and the revenue when all
buyers have low values.
Opt
(
D¯
)
=
∫
[0,1]n\∏j [q¯j ,1] maxS∈[n]
∑
i∈S
φ¯i(qi)d
nq +
∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
S∈[n]
∑
i∈S
φ¯i(qi)d
nq
It suffices to show∫
[0,1]n\∏j [q¯j ,1] maxS∈[n]
∑
i∈S
φ¯i(qi)d
nq ≥ (1− 2)
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈H(q)
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq (9)
and ∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
S∈[n]
∑
i∈S
φ¯i(qi)d
nq ≥ (1− 2)
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈L(q)
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq (10)
Proof of (9): Note that for any i and any qi < q¯i, φ¯i(qi) = v¯. Thus, the LHS of (9) is lower
bounded by ∫
[0,1]n\∏i[q¯i,1] v¯d
nq =
(
1−
∏
i∈[n]
(1− q¯i)
)
v¯ ≥ (1− )
∑
i∈[n]
q¯iv¯
where the inequality follows by Lemma 6.3. On the other hand, the RHS (omitting the 1 − 2
factor) is upper bounded by∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈H(q)
∑
i∈S
φi(qi)d
nq ≤
∫
[0,1]n
∑
i∈H(q)
max
{
φi(qi), 0
}
dnq
≤
∑
i∈[n]
∫
[0,q¯i]
max{φi(qi), 0}dqi
Therefore, to show (9), it suffices to show that for every i ∈ [n],
q¯iv¯ ≥ (1− )
∫
qi∈[0,q¯i]
max{φi(qi), 0}
Let Ri(q) denote the revenue of a single-buyer auction with a reserve price that has quantile q w.r.t.
Di. The LHS of the above is the revenue of a single-buyer auction with reserve price v¯ w.r.t. Di,
i.e., Ri(q¯i). The RHS is the maximum revenue of a single-buyer auction with a reserve price at
least v¯, i.e., maxq∈[0,q¯i]Ri(q). Note that Di’s being regular implies that Ri(q) is a concave function
over [0, 1] and Ri(1) ≥ 0. Thus, we have that Ri(q¯i) ≥ (1 − q¯i) maxq∈[0,q¯i]Ri(q). The inequality
then follows by q¯i ≤  (Lemma 6.2).
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Proof of (10): Note that for any q ∈ ∏j∈[n][q¯j , 1], we have L(q) = [n]. So we can rewrite the
LHS of (10) as follows.∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
S∈[n]
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq =
∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
S∈L(q)
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq
For any q−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, any qi < q¯i ≤ q′i, suppose q = (qi,q−i) and q′ = (q′i,q−i). We have that
L(q) ⊂ L(q′), and for any i ∈ L(q), qi = q′i. Thus, maxS∈L(q)
∑
j∈S φj(qj) ≤ maxS∈L(q′)
∑
j∈S φj(q
′
j).
Therefore, we have∫
∏
j [q¯j ,1]
max
S∈L(q)
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq ≥ (1− q¯1)
∫
[0,1]×∏nj=2[q¯j ,1] maxS∈L(q)
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq
≥ (1− q¯1)(1− q¯2)
∫
[0,1]2×∏nj=3[q¯j ,1] maxS∈L(q)
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq
≥ . . .
≥
∏
j∈[n]
(1− q¯j)
∫
[0,1]n
max
S∈L(q)
∑
j∈S
φj(qj)d
nq
Finally, by Lemma 6.3, we have that
∏
j∈[n](1− q¯j) ≥ 1− . Putting together proves (10).
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Matt Weinberg for the useful discussions about Revenue Monotonicity.
This work was done in part while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of
Computing.
Bibliography
[1] Pablo Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, and S Matthew Weinberg. Optimal and
efficient parametric auctions. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Sym-
posium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 596–604. SIAM, 2013.
[2] Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D Hartline, and Yishay Mansour. Reducing mech-
anism design to algorithm design via machine learning. Journal of Computer and System
Sciences, 74(8):1245–1270, 2008.
[3] Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Rough-
garden, and Xiaoming Xu. Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders. In Pro-
ceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC ’13, pages 91–102,
New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-1962-1. doi: 10.1145/2482540.2482555.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2482540.2482555.
[4] Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer. Auction versus negotiations. American Economic Review,
1996.
[5] Yang Cai and Constantinos Daskalakis. Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional
pricing. Games and Economic Behavior, 92:266–305, 2015.
32
[6] Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden. The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In
Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014, New York, NY, USA, May 31 - June 03,
2014, pages 243–252, 2014. doi: 10.1145/2591796.2591867. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/2591796.2591867.
[7] Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan. Revenue maximization with a
single sample. Games and Economic Behavior, 2014.
[8] Shaddin Dughmi, Li Han, and Noam Nisan. Sampling and representation complexity of revenue
maximization. In Web and Internet Economics, pages 277–291. Springer, 2014.
[9] Edith Elkind. Designing and learning optimal finite support auctions. In Proceedings of the
eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 736–745. Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2007.
[10] Eyal Even-Dar, Jon Feldman, Yishay Mansour, and S Muthukrishnan. Position auctions with
bidder-specific minimum prices. In Internet and Network Economics, pages 577–584. Springer,
2008.
[11] Jason D Hartline and Tim Roughgarden. Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In Proceedings
of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 225–234. ACM, 2009.
[12] Zhiyi Huang, Yishay Mansour, and Tim Roughgarden. Making the most of your samples.
In Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’15,
Portland, OR, USA, June 15-19, 2015, pages 45–60, 2015.
[13] Se´bastien Lahaie and David M Pennock. Revenue analysis of a family of ranking rules for
keyword auctions. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages
50–56. ACM, 2007.
[14] Stefano Leonardi and Tim Roughgarden. Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders. In
Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC
’12, pages 427–434, New York, NY, USA, 2012. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-1245-5. doi:
10.1145/2213977.2214018. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2213977.2214018.
[15] Jamie Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden. The pseudo-dimension of nearly-optimal auctions.
In NIPS, page Forthcoming, 12 2015. URL papers/auction-pseudo.pdf.
[16] Roger B. Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73,
1981.
[17] Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz. Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: A
field experiment. In Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages
59–60. ACM, 2011.
[18] Bem Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A Kash, and Peter Key. Ranking and tradeoffs in
sponsored search auctions. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic
commerce, pages 751–766. ACM, 2013.
[19] Maurice Sion et al. On general minimax theorems. Pacific J. Math, 8(1):171–176, 1958.
[20] Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis. Vickrey auctions for irregular distributions. In
Web and Internet Economics, pages 422–435. Springer, 2013.
33
[21] David RM Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Revenue optimization in the generalized
second-price auction. In Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce,
pages 837–852. ACM, 2013.
34
